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Citizenship and free movement 
in a changing EU
Navigating an archipelago of contradictions
Jo Shaw
Introduction
One result of the UK’s referendum on EU membership on 23 June 2016 
has been to leave behind a situation of considerable legal and personal 
uncertainty for EU27 citizens and their families resident in the UK, and 
UK citizens and their families resident in the EU27 Member States.1 It 
has also struck a blow against the viability of much of the UK economy, 
where a ‘high employment– low wage– low productivity’ triangle has 
largely been kept in place by a ready supply of labour from elsewhere 
within the Single Market, especially since the post- 2004 enlargements. 
It is the putative impact of this supply of flexible and arguably cheaper 
labour on domestic labour markets which means that calls to end free 
movement come not just from those who oppose immigration per se, 
but also from those on the political left who profess an internationalist 
outlook yet who argue that free movement makes it harder to pursue 
domestic policies that push the UK towards being a ‘high wage– high 
productivity’ economy.2
The focus in this chapter is on the individual rights and status con-
sequences of the ending of free movement as a result of leaving the EU, 
rather than wider questions about either the principles (Parker 2017) or 
the appropriate policy and regulatory mix (Boswell et al. 2017) for immi-
gration and mobility in the post- Brexit UK.3
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Ending free movement?
The basic situation is easy to state but hard to elaborate with sufficient 
precision to cover all eventualities: leaving the EU means an end to the 
regime of ‘free movement’, which has fostered and protected mobility (by 
workers, the self- employed, service- providers, students, pensioners and 
others, including third- country national family members) within the EU 
for the last 60 years. But designing a revised legal regime for ‘free movers’ 
after Brexit is a task of immense complexity, given the intricacy of existing 
EU law in this field (e.g. for social security and pension issues). Resolving 
these scenarios brings into play governance structures at many different 
levels, including national and subnational law, EU law, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and poten-
tially other sources of migrants’ rights at the international level. Because 
of the large numbers of UK and EU27 citizens involved, reciprocity is the 
watchword, with an agreement at the point of withdrawal needed, in 
order to avoid negative impacts on individuals on both sides of the equa-
tion. As negotiations under Article 50 got underway, it became clear that 
all parties shared the view that free movement should be at the top of the 
agenda, even though agreement may be hard to reach.
By July 2017, the UK and the European Commission (leading in the 
negotiations on behalf of the EU and the EU27) had both put forward 
their outline positions on the situation of EU citizens in the context of 
withdrawal. There was a great deal of distance between the two starting 
positions, noted by the negotiators themselves, although this has grad-
ually reduced over time as the UK has conceded on key points.4 It has 
been widely noted that the original UK proposals would entail a signifi-
cant degradation of rights for EU citizens compared with the status quo 
(Peers 2017; Reynolds 2017; Yeo 2017). For example, even EU citizens 
in the UK with the status of ‘permanent resident’, with documentation 
issued by the UK Home Office, would need to re- apply to the UK authori-
ties in order to benefit from the new ‘settled status’. If they failed to do so, 
they could find themselves in breach of UK immigration law, regardless 
of how long they had been resident in the UK, or under what conditions. 
This could potentially have very serious consequences if applied strictly, 
especially for vulnerable persons such as the elderly, those with disabili-
ties, or persons suffering from ill health. It has also been noted that Brexit 
risks exacerbating the gender bias previously observed in free move-
ment rules because EU law does not recognise caring as ‘work’ (O’Brien 
2017). In addition, family reunion rights would be reduced (in line with 
the very restrictive income- based rules applicable to UK citizens and 
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third- country nationals seeking family reunion) and those who left the 
UK for more than two years would lose their ‘settled status’ and would 
re- enter under whatever future regime applied to EU citizens (presum-
ably as third- country nationals). The absence of an unconditional right 
of return (one of the classic citizenship rights) sharply differentiates the 
proposed ‘settled status’ from UK citizenship.
These are not trivial questions affecting just a few people. It is not 
an exaggeration to suggest that the loss of individual rights resulting 
from the UK’s departure from the EU could be the most substantial loss of 
rights in Europe since the break- up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, with the 
loss of the status of ‘Yugoslav’ citizen for millions of people. Just as with 
the break- up of Yugoslavia, which saw individuals in many of the suc-
cessor states experience problems related to uncertain citizenship and 
immigration status (Shaw & Štiks 2012), so severing the bond of free 
movement law, which many have relied upon in order to build their lives, 
threatens to reduce life chances and life choices for millions now and in 
the future.
While none of the non- UK EU citizens resident in the UK ought to be 
at risk of statelessness as a result of the withdrawal of the UK, since they 
are by definition citizens of one (or more) of the EU27 Member States, 
the body of free movement law nonetheless offers substantial enhance-
ments in the socioeconomic, political and civic domains. It offers out-
comes that are well worth defending on both practical and philosophical 
grounds (de Witte 2016; Salomone 2017). Ironically, because of disen-
franchisement effects in relation to national elections and referendums 
(most EU citizens resident in the UK and UK citizens resident long- term 
outside the UK could not vote), there were fewer opportunities for politi-
cal voices to articulate the value of free movement during the EU referen-
dum campaign (Shaw 2017). Simply to suggest that EU citizens resident 
in the UK should themselves become UK citizens misses the point: many 
cannot (for a variety of reasons); the process is very expensive; they 
may fail whatever probity or integration tests are applied; or they may 
not wish to risk losing their ‘home’ state citizenship. Finally, there is the 
sheer bureaucratic effort involved, with the UK not geared up to deal 
with millions of residence applications, never mind millions of new natu-
ralisation applications. Ultimately, becoming a citizen in the formal sense 
(and the linkage thereby made between citizenship and immigration) is 
not the same thing as being a free mover. It is, however, clear from the 
famous ‘citizens of nowhere’ comment in her speech to the Conservative 
Party conference in October 2016, that the difficult situations in which 
those with fluid mobile residencies, complex multinational families 
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and/ or transnational work/ study/ life commitments do not inspire 
instinctive sympathy on the part of Prime Minister Theresa May.
It is also self- evident that the complexities of free movement law 
did not enter the minds of the vast majority of those who voted in the 
UK’s referendum. Free movement had been constructed, in the minds of 
many, as one of the problems facing a UK struggling with austerity and 
stagnant wages, not one of the solutions (Shaw 2016a). One re action 
has been to treat those exercising free movement rights as ‘lucky’ immi-
grants, not subject to the ‘hostile environment’ rules for third- country 
national immigrants, introduced by successive governments and sub-
stantially upgraded by Home Secretary Theresa May between 2010 and 
2016. When that narrative is applied, it starts to look wrong that in some 
areas (e.g. family reunion) EU citizens do better than UK citizens. It has 
also been easy to blame EU citizens for shortages in public services, rather 
than budget restrictions imposed on providers. The notion of EU citizen-
ship as a reciprocal bond founded on enforceable rights joining together 
citizens across the EU28 was completely lost within public discourse, not 
least because the Leave campaign was regularly punctuated by sweeping 
and unsubstantiated claims that EU citizens would have the same status 
after Brexit as before.5
Everything that has been done since June 2016 by the UK govern-
ment has reinforced a sense of chaos and uncertainty for EU27 citizens, 
and for UK citizens resident in the EU27. There has been a very high 
rejection rate (reportedly up to 28 per cent) of applications for perma-
nent residence documentation made by longstanding EU27 citizen resi-
dents (although the Home Office has claimed that this has not changed in 
recent years),6 with many rejections referring to the notorious – and argu-
ably both unnecessary and insurmountable  – comprehensive sickness 
insurance requirement applicable to those not in employment (Davies 
2017). Such rejections come with a letter from the Home Office stating 
that the unsuccessful applicant is not exercising treaty rights and should 
make arrangements to leave the UK. This spreads fear and despondency, 
even if such letters are not followed up on. Successful applications often 
entail costly consultations with lawyers. For months, there was no official 
government policy on what might come next, except for blandishments 
of a ‘generous offer’ in the making. Meanwhile the European Commission 
issued a set of principles agreed with the EU27 suggesting that EU/ UK 
citizens (on both sides of the UK/ EU27 divide) should enjoy the exact 
same rights they had enjoyed under free movement, even if that meant 
lifelong protection, complex arrangements for social security and pen-
sion aggregation, continuation of mutual recognition of qualifications, 
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the right of return or onward mobility, and the maintenance of the juris-
diction of the CJEU. The latter condition runs contrary to one of Prime 
Minister May’s ‘red lines’ from her Lancaster House speech.7 Absurdly, 
when the UK made its widely criticised ‘offer’ in June 2017, this was 
accompanied by calls from government politicians for the EU to recip-
rocate the UK offer, something which was impossible since the EU paper 
had preceded the UK one by several weeks.
It is clear that the unravelling of the composite polity that is ‘the 
UK in the EU’ raises serious practical issues for those whom it affects 
directly (i.e. those who are already in the UK) – and also for those indir-
ectly affected, including potential future movers as well as businesses 
and employers. There will be substantial opportunity costs for the UK 
economy in terms of losing access to a ready supply of labour coming 
from elsewhere within the Single Market under flexible conditions. 
But that point runs against another nostrum of Conservative Party 
policy, the commitment to reduce net immigration to below 100,000 
per annum. Pursuing this policy is bound to push up prices for compa-
nies and consumers and it is not clear that it will lead to higher levels 
of better remunerated employment for so- called ‘native Britons’ (Portes 
2017a, 2017b).
These implications, plus the loss of personal freedoms, are perhaps 
just starting to gain traction with the wider UK public, with one survey 
indicating that 60 per cent of UK citizens, including 58 per cent of Leave 
voters, want to keep their EU citizenship even after Brexit.8 It is worth 
setting this figure against the figures for EU citizens resident outside 
their Member State of citizenship, which sat at just 16 million in 2016 
(against a population of over 500 million), and amounts to less than 4 
per cent.9 This is somewhat misleading, however, and a better under-
standing of physical and virtual European mobilities emerges from the 
work of Salamon´ska and Recchi (2016), who assess the scale of the 
manifold cross- border practices of EU citizens and residents, across a 
number of dimensions including degree of permanence and frequency. 
They conclude that up to 20 per cent of the European population could 
be described as highly ‘mobile’ in this broader sense, but even this figure 
is still well short of those survey findings showing ‘attachment’ to EU 
citizenship. It is of course possible that the conflation of EU citizenship 
and free movement is starting to break down, so that the former is start-
ing to be understood as a political value above and beyond the latter 
(e.g. giving the opportunity to participate democratically by voting in 
European Parliament elections). Or it could be a finding that correlates 
closely to another survey, which indicated that voters were more likely 
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to say that any trade- off between the economy and immigration should 
be resolved in favour of policies promoting growth and trade, even if 
this meant more immigration or free movement.10 The complexities  – 
and unpalatable consequences  – of unravelling free movement might 
just be a catalyst contributing to the collapse of the case for Brexit. Or 
perhaps this is just the early stirrings of ‘euro- nostalgia’ that will sweep 
across the UK in the years to come until memories fade. Brexit Britain 
truly is, as I  have noted previously, an ‘archipelago of contradictions’ 
(Shaw 2016b).
Free movement and citizenship
The very idea that European citizenship as a legal status for UK citizens 
could somehow survive the separation of the UK from the EU brings 
us back to the core issue of what EU citizenship actually is, and how it 
relates both to free movement and to national citizenship (Mindus 2017; 
Schrauwen 2017). Exploring the relationship to national citizenship can 
lead us along well- trodden pathways, especially in terms of case law of 
the CJEU. EU citizenship is a creature of EU law, but it is based on access 
points controlled under national law. The McCarthy case suggested that 
those with dual citizenship of the host state and another Member State 
do not enjoy the protection of EU law,11 although the pending Lounes 
case may well see a different approach taken by the CJEU in the case of a 
person naturalised after having enjoyed family life with a third- country 
national in the host state whilst only a citizen of another Member 
State, if the advisory opinion of the Advocate General is followed in the 
November 2017 judgement.12 Furthermore, the CJEU has held that EU 
law requires the possibility of judicial review of decisions on deprivation 
of national citizenship, if this would have the effect of depriving an EU 
citizen of substantially all of the benefits of EU citizenship. However, this 
proposition was developed for a scenario where it was the actions of the 
EU citizen in question – in combination with national citizenship laws – 
which triggered the scenario in which he was deprived of the benefits 
of EU citizenship.13 We do not yet know how the CJEU might approach 
the question of loss of EU citizenship because a Member State withdraws 
from the EU.
At first sight, it seems that if EU law no longer applies after seces-
sion/ withdrawal of the UK, then EU citizenship must surely lapse. 
Absent any international agreement specifically preserving such a 
status or certain rights attaching to it (e.g. under Article 50), it seems 
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obvious that a withdrawing state retains the power, under international 
law, to deprive its citizens of the status of EU citizen, and to render the 
legal effect of that status, for citizens of other continuing Member States, 
nugatory within its territory. In similar terms, other Member States have 
no obligation to treat UK citizens other than as third- country nationals 
on their territory. There is no parallel with the duties on states in cir-
cumstances of secession, as there is no risk that such an act could render 
affected persons stateless. They are still protected by national citizen-
ship somewhere. There would be protection of non- citizen residents of 
the withdrawing state in relation to certain rights, such as family life, 
under international human rights law. The Kuric case of the European 
Court of Human Rights14 (Vidmar 2014) appears to ‘freeze’ the rights of 
those who have regular residence in the host state and who do not accede 
to the citizenship of that state when it secedes. Although developed in 
the context of the secession of a former Yugoslav republic (Slovenia), 
the principles in this case can be applied to a UK withdrawal from the 
EU (Mindus 2017; Schrauwen 2017). This seems to be what the offer 
of ‘settled status’ is reflecting, although that status offers less than EU 
citizenship.
The general proposition must be that national citizenship status 
will be unaffected by Brexit. The only caveat upon that point comes from 
the Tjebbes case, pending before the CJEU, concerning legislation with-
drawing Dutch citizenship from persons who are resident for more than 
10 years in a third country and who have taken on that country’s citizen-
ship.15 This case has obvious implications for the post- Brexit scenario, as 
the UK will be such a ‘third country’ after Brexit, so any intervention by 
the CJEU to suggest that Member States are not free to withdraw citi-
zenship in such circumstances because of EU citizenship could be for the 
benefit of EU27 citizens resident in the UK.
For the future, we could speculate that further adjustments to 
national citizenship laws might be a desirable part of the solution to the 
upheaval brought about by Brexit, if a stronger parallel is drawn to the 
impact of secession from a state. Seceding parts of states must attend to 
issues of citizenship as a matter of urgency, as must states from which 
regions secede. But the UK, on withdrawal from the EU, is making no 
moves to facilitate citizenship access of resident non- citizens, despite 
the loss of their preferential ‘free mover’ status. On the contrary, it seems 
that this group must accommodate themselves to the UK’s requirements, 
rather than the other way around, by applying for a form of ‘settled sta-
tus’ that falls far short of both national citizenship and of the protec-
tions and freedoms previously offered by free movement. Initially, there 
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was no sign of other Member States with restrictive approaches to dual 
citizenship, such as the Netherlands, Estonia or Austria, making adjust-
ments to citizenship law to accommodate resident UK citizens or to 
offer wider access to dual citizenship to protect the interests of new or 
existing citizens. On the contrary, the prime minister of the Netherlands 
appeared to double down on his country’s resistance to dual citizenship 
(Boffey 2017a; EUDO Citizenship 2015). However, perhaps in a harbin-
ger of further changes to come, in October 2017 the new Dutch coali-
tion adopted a more liberal approach to dual citizenship which was the 
existing policy of just one of the four coalition partners (the D66 Liberal 
Democrats party), offering assurances to Dutch citizens resident in the 
UK that they would be able to keep their Netherlands citizenship after 
naturalising in the UK (Boffey 2017b). The details of how this might 
work are not as yet known.
Despite, or perhaps because of, the absence of state action to 
remedy the situation, some European citizens – for whom it is possi-
ble and useful  – are taking action to acquire new or additional citi-
zenships as an insurance policy against the impending restriction of 
free movement. Quite substantial numbers of UK citizens are pursuing 
ancestry- based or family- relationship- based options in order to pre-
serve or open up new options for mobility, in addition to the classic 
mode of acquisition by residence/ naturalisation:16 Irish citizenship 
has been heavily in demand reflecting the many millions of UK citizens 
who have at least one Irish- born grandparent; German citizenship 
is an option for those descended from persons deprived of their citi-
zenship in Nazi Germany; Italian citizenship is accessible not only on 
the basis of descent, but also via a spouse. For those wealthy enough, 
there remains the option of purchasing citizenships and residencies in 
a number of Member States with minimal physical residence obliga-
tions (Džankic 2015).
Many EU citizens resident in the UK are pursuing the UK citizenship 
route despite the considerable expense and the numerous bureaucratic 
hurdles in place (e.g. the prior acquisition of the permanent residence 
documents that those same EU citizens are now being told will be value-
less after Brexit).17 The irony is that many are seeking UK citizenship not 
because they feel more integrated in the UK, but precisely because they 
face more hostility than ever before. A wave of xenophobia seems to have 
been unleashed by the UK’s ‘Brexit experience’.18 But there are still many 
mixed- nationality families, as well as highly mobile persons and groups, 
who find that citizenship acquisition does not match up to the fluid flex-
ible possibilities of free movement.
 
 
 
 
BrExit  And BEyond164
  
Conclusions
Free movement is not, and has never been, an unconditional ‘right’ with 
benefits attached, and it remains primarily linked to economic interests. 
It also has a ‘dark’ side in the form of the posting of workers by firms 
providing services on a transnational basis; the position of these workers 
is barely regulated under EU law, and they are therefore subject to the 
vagaries of national law alone (MacShane 2017). But what is interest-
ing (and even ironic) about the post- Brexit period is that a clearer per-
spective on the value of free movement has now opened up. It is easier 
to argue how free movement for individuals has operated to obviate the 
restrictions of national citizenship and immigration regimes and to offer 
mobility options with low transaction costs over the lifecourse (for work, 
study, family or lifestyle reasons). This highlights the extent to which – in 
perception and practice, if not in law – EU citizenship has evolved into 
a form of transnational citizenship practice that complements the lacu-
nae that arise where overlapping national citizenship and immigration 
regimes are all that is on offer (Mindus 2017).
For the EU, and indeed for the international community more 
generally, Brexit creates an unprecedented situation. It has given rise to 
equally unprecedented civic mobilisation around demands for the pro-
tection of acquired rights, including several European Citizens’ Initiatives 
registered by the European Commission. Some have raised the possibil-
ity of EU citizenship becoming a freestanding status that can be acceded 
to other than through the nationality of the Member States, with UK 
citizens being offered the possibility of ‘associate citizenship’ (discussed 
in Schrauwen 2017), but at present such proposals remain utopian 
rather than practical in character. Eventually, unscrambling the eggs of 
free movement may demand some creative solutions going beyond the 
scope of the Article 50 agreement itself, including increased pressure 
on Member States to remove barriers to dual citizenship.19 This seems 
appropriate in an increasingly global age.
 
 
